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Abstract 
The action of active interest groups (lobbies) has been traditionally considered to 
be a source of harmful waste for the economy which reduces social well-being. 
Can this analysis be adapted to the case of large unorganised groups which do not 
ask for anything directly? Or, on the contrary, does the setting up of policies which 
improve the situation of these large groups permit an improvement in social 
welfare? We start from classical (public choice) analyses of lobbying and rent-
seeking developed since the 1970s, closely linked with the hypothesis of re-
election-seeking politicians, before extending our analysis also to consider non-
sector-specific policies and passive interest groups (notably those too large to meet 
the Olsonian condition of efficient collective action). Then the research question to 
be answered becomes whether promoting the interest of large groups can deliver 
social welfare as defined by the incumbent’s social welfare function. We refer to the 
political cycles’ evidence to consider that no social welfare objective can motivate 
the favouring of large groups. 
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Introduction 
Free trade is generally considered to be the optimal policy for a small open 
economy. If free trade is associated with lump sum transfers between individuals, it 
is then in the interest of each individual in an economy (e.g. Hillman 1989: 1), and 
is a Pareto optimum at the international level. Nevertheless it has traditionally been 
recognised that a few exceptions to this rule exist (e.g. protection of emerging 
industries, optimal tariff), but for which the practical application can appear very 
limited (e.g. Magee, 1997: 532). If social welfare is maximised for zero protection, 
positive protection is suboptimal. How can this situation be explained, as in reality 
international exchanges are hindered by numerous barriers, and no State practices 
free trade? (Magee, 1997: 542) Why would a country choose a suboptimal situation 
for itself rather than an optimal solution? Firstly, the case of a suboptimal situation 
in which each of the agents finds themselves in a situation inferior to that of the 
optimal situation, must be excluded. In fact, whichever way economic and trade 
policy are formed, they come from at least one individual, if not from a majority. An 
effective suboptimal policy thus advantages certain agents and disadvantages 
others. This policy is thus implemented by the agents who benefit from it. The idea 
of a benevolent government must therefore be dismissed; as social welfare is not 
the criterion which guides the policy (otherwise free trade would prevail). A 
protectionist trade policy, whatever the degree, is therefore shaped by private 
interests. Thus protectionism must be the result of a political process.1 Trade policy 
is the privileged instrument of political support; the other instruments at the 
disposal of government have the disadvantage of being too transparent (Grossman 
and Helpman, 1995: 680). However there is no reason to think that trade policy is 
the only lever of political support. 
In this article the concept of endogenous policy is extended to economic policy in 
the widest sense. In this context the effects on welfare of policies implemented by 
re-election seeking politicians, or more simply those looking for political support, 
will be discussed to answer this question: in the case of interest groups driven 
political support would the traditional negative link between lobbying and welfare 
be reversed? 
In the first section the principle of lobbying will be summarised and the concept of 
political support will be extended to unorganised interest groups. In the second 
section the commonly acknowledged effects of lobbying on social welfare will be 
presented and the link between the satisfaction of unorganised interest groups and 
social welfare will be emphasised. The last section shows the empirical relevance 
of our approach. 
Lobbies and interest groups: a new look at 
endogenous policies 
Small versus large groups 
For private interests to shape economic policy, it has been traditionally considered 
that they need to organise themselves into pressure groups (lobbies). Apart from 
the pressure itself, the activity of the lobby is rent-seeking, which corresponds to 
obtaining a (beneficial) non-competitive situation. In the case of trade policy, tariffs 
are endogenous when they are established in response to the demands of lobbies, 
                                                                                                         
1 This has been acknowledged for a long time; see Baldwin (1984: 674), Grossman and Helpman (1994: 
835), Hillman (1992: 7), Mayer (1984: 983), Peirce (1991: 276), Pincus (1975: 763), Wellisz and Wilson 
(1986: 369). 
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and we can then talk about endogenous protection2 (for empirical evidence of the 
endogenous aspect of protection see Hillman, 1989: 133-149).  
A distinction must be made between pressure groups (lobbies) and interest groups. 
A lobby is primarily an interest group but, unlike the latter, the members of the 
group have joined forces to organise a collective action in order to collectively 
pursue their individual common interest. 
In fact, according to Baldwin (1982) there are a certain number of basic factors for 
a lobby to appear (necessary conditions, especially including Olsonian conditions3 
related to small-size groups) but, according to him, a triggering factor is necessary 
to initiate the change from potential lobby (that is the interest group) into active 
lobby (pressure group). This "trigger" could be a crisis, or a series of crises striking 
the common interests of the members of the potential lobby (Baldwin, 1982: 279). 
This means that the individuals organise themselves more naturally or more 
efficiently to counter losses than to seek income (realistic hypothesis that an 
individual perceives a loss more acutely than the loss of potential gain). Once the 
lobby is set up, it can become more efficient and organise itself, not only against 
losses or risks of losses, but also to obtain advantages (which particularly lead to 
theories of "rent seeking"). Conversely, interest groups have not overcome the 
obstacles related to collective action, which is most often due to their characteristic 
of large size. In the literature on political support it is generally considered that 
everything that is endogenous comes from lobbies. 
An original feature of this paper is to consider taking the interests of large groups 
into account on the grounds of political support, which thus establishes 
endogenous policies which are not sector-based ("global policies"). If this idea is 
not widespread it is nevertheless not new, and it seems that this demarcation 
criterion between endogenous sector-based or global policies could be credited to 
an article by Travis (1968).  
In this way Travis showed that American tariffs specific to labour protection were 
prohibitive whatever the sector concerned (Travis, 1968: 640). This study meant 
that if one considered a large unorganised group obtaining protection, the 
protection could be explained other than in terms of lobbying. The large group 
could in fact be protected by the government because it represents significant 
electoral weight. As Browning (1974: 376) then pointed out the government can 
elaborate legislation to win votes, even without lobbying. One may think 
considering political support in terms of number of ballots would make political 
support and social welfare converge (the political process being a way to 
aggregate individual preferences, despite its weaknesses known since Condorcet’s 
paradox). 
However, legislation made to win votes from an identified population group is the 
expression of an "endogenous" policy in that it is not driven by the search for social 
welfare (which comes back to the fact that social welfare is not an addition of 
individual well-being or of community interest in a Benthamian way). 
                                                                                                         
2 The counterpart of the protection is either promises of financial contributions given to political 
candidates by the lobbies before the election (a typical approach to electoral competition, pioneered by 
Brock and Magee, 1978) or recurring financial contributions given to the incumbent by the lobbies to fine 
tune the shape of protection they benefit (a typical approach to "influence driven contributions" 
pioneered by Peltzman, 1976, and formalised by Helpman and Grossman, 1994, 1995). 
3 The cases in which collective action could emerge are the cases where at least certain production 
factors are not mobile ("specific" production factors). These specific production factors form the common 
interest of the different producers of the same product. However the existence of specific production 
factors is not a sufficient condition for the formation of lobbies (Grossman and Helpman, 1995: 681). If 
the specific factor is concentrated among few members, the incentive for collective action is strong, 
which is close to the condition of small size for the formation and efficiency of lobbies. See Olson (1965) 
for this condition of efficiency through small size. 
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The pioneer analysis of Travis thus corresponds to "endogenous" policies because 
they are guided by unorganised interest groups (which are therefore not pressure 
groups). This means that in terms of political support, interest groups should be 
taken into account by their electoral weight (passive influence) and not by their 
lobbying, which would necessitate collective action.4  
From large groups to endogenous economic policies 
The object of this paper is to extend the concept of endogenous economic policy to 
its widest sense, and not simply limit it to trade protection, to understand whether in 
this context the traditional negative link between lobbying and welfare would be 
reversed (see introduction for the sub-optimality of protection)? The definition of an 
endogenous economic policy is thus close to that of endogenous protection, but it 
must however be extended in two complementary and related dimensions: (1) by 
considering that political support in its widest sense is at the base of endogenous 
policies; and (2) by extending the analysis beyond the perimeter of sector-oriented 
policies, thus distinguishing global endogenous policies and sector-oriented 
endogenous policies. 
These two dimensions are interrelated in that (unorganised) interest groups are 
most often large groups (cf. the small size condition for the success of collective 
action). This feature of size automatically has the effect of increasing the number of 
agents involved and thus increasing the number of sectors concerned leads to 
global and not exclusively sector-oriented  policies. 
In the model of endogenous protection, an economic policy is defined as 
endogenous as soon as it is implemented according to identified interest groups 
(interest groups or pressure groups/lobbies)5 and not for the consideration of social 
welfare (classical model of the benevolent dictator). If it is interest groups, it is more 
in an electoral context (the groups are not taken into consideration for their 
contribution like in Peltzman (1976), but for their electoral weight during the future 
election); if it is lobbies, it corresponds to a classical case of lobbying thus including 
the role of contributions. 
The first case corresponds to what we call "global endogenous policies", the 
second corresponds to "sector-oriented endogenous policies". 
Lobbying, interest groups and social welfare 
Classical analysis of the effects on social welfare 
The analysis of the effects of lobbying on the social welfare was initiated by 
Browning (1974). A source of inefficiency thus appears as lobbying leads to 
diversion of resources in non-productive activities.6 This diversion corresponds to 
the contributions received by politicians to finance their campaigns, because it is 
money taken from a productive use. Besides these contributions (standard 
Peltzmanian case), Rodrik (1986) identified three types of social welfare costs 
generated by lobbying: (i) the direct cost of lobbying, that is total amount of work 
diverted from productive activities; (ii) the absolute loss due to excess production 
                                                                                                         
4 Denzau and Munger (1986) also showed that unorganised voters can be indirectly represented in the 
making of economic policy just because a contrario the lobbies prefer to work with legislator politicians 
who don’t have informed voters opposed to their views in their home districts. 
5 For an historical example of the antagonism between private interests and social welfare in the case of 
endogenous trade policy, see The Economist (2008). The article describes how the American Free 
Trade Policy was challenged by the "Tariff Act" of 1930, voted following the initiative of Willis Hawley 
(Congressman) and Reed Smoot (Senator), in spite of a petition from President Hoover signed by more 
than a thousand American economists. 
6 These are DUPs popularised by Bhagwati (1980), then Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980). 
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from the sector in competition with imports; and (iii) the loss in consumption caused 
by the increase in the domestic price (Rodrik,1986: 295-296). 
Following this, the social cost of lobbying was measured. For example Laband and 
Sophocleus (1988) showed that profit-seeking drastically reduced the growth of the 
American GNP by 22.6 percent for the year 1985 (also see Horgos and 
Zimmermann, 2009a on this point, and Desai and Olofsgard, 2011, for the specific 
case of developing countries). 
Lobbying has been traditionally seen as being used to protect oneself against less 
expensive imports from the rest of the world. However the protection itself creates 
a situation of second best. Bhagwati was the first to analyse the problem of second 
best in a world with lobbying. Bhagwati (1980) considered that trade protection was 
either exogenous (established without lobbying), or endogenous (established with 
lobbying) and, in this context, showed that this departure from free trade is not 
necessarily synonymous with a decline in social welfare. Indeed, the addition of 
one distortion (lobbying) to another (protection) means that lobbying can have a 
negative social cost (Bhagwati, 1980: 357).7  
This paradox was later criticised, particularly by Tullock (1981), who showed that 
from the time one also considers the matter of customs revenue from the tariff, the 
paradox is reduced. Finally the paradox disappears if one considers the hypothesis 
which is widespread in the literature, that the activity of profit-seeking is perfectly 
competitive.8 Such a hypothesis has a corollary of dissipation of the income 
through the expenses involved in obtaining it; the optimum second best aspect 
thus disappears. Anam and Katz (1988: 220) showed it starting from monopoly 
rent, by emphasizing that in this case, the marginal cost of production in the 
monopolistic sector (including the cost of rent seeking) is reflected in the price.  
Unorganised interest groups and social welfare 
Let us now come back to the distinction between "global" and "sector-oriented" 
policies. The difference is not only semantic (in which case it would suffice to 
consider "global" and "partial" policies so that the full sense of this distinction can 
be understood. The distinction can indeed be considered to be deeper. On the one 
hand, one can consider the analysis of sector-oriented policies which ask the 
classical questions of aggregated preferences, or of groups of agents who work 
towards the general interest in their own way, but whose respective interests are in 
conflict. On the other hand, an analysis of the balance of political power within an 
economy, with the help of global policies, can be taken into consideration. In the 
latter case, the interests at stake are not necessarily conflicting and can thus all the 
more work towards the general interest because taking them into account allows 
the incumbents to have a function of social welfare (FSW) in keeping with the 
structuring of society, or at the very least not disconnected from social reality. 
Furthermore, unorganised groups carry weight by their vote and not by the 
contributions (cf. Travis, 1968). In this way, they do not divert labour resources like 
Rodrik, or (especially) contributions like Peltzman. One can therefore consider that 
the influence of interest groups on economic policy does not include any negative 
element. 
Figure 1 shows that the curve of utility possibilities confronts the two individuals. 
The figure’s shape comes from the fact that the incentives to invest vary according 
                                                                                                         
7 That means that the factors diverted from their productive use have a negative shadow price. This 
point is explained in detail by Hillman (1989, pp. 53-58) and more especially taken up again by Hillman 
and Katz (1994: 104). 
8 Cf. Foster (1971: 177), for a definition of competitive rent seeking and cf. Corcoran and Karels (1985: 
227), for the general nature of this concept. More precisely, Monissen (1991: 125) studies the rent 
dissipation conditions. 
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to redistribution – see Wolfelsperger (1985) for example. Point A corresponds to a 
Benthamian FSW (addition of utilities), Point C to Rawls’ solution, Point D to the 
egalitarian solution and Point B to any FSW. 
Figure 1: Utilities and function of social welfare 
 
Let us consider Point B, which could correspond to taking unorganised interests 
into account. One is thus in an exogenous context, in which a benevolent dictator 
imposes his FSW that authoritatively settles questions of intransitivity linked to the 
collective aggregation of individual preferences. The information here thus goes 
from interest groups to the incumbent, who best calibrates his FSW. Therefore, 
although interest groups are passive, they can have a positive impact in terms of 
social welfare. One thus faces, in some ways, the issue developed in the theories 
of informative lobbying (Austen-Smith and Wright, 1992; Bennedsen and 
Feldmann, 2006; or Lagerlöf, 2006). However, whatever the function of social 
welfare considered, it corresponds to the social preferences of the incumbent and 
can thus not vary according to the electoral cycles. If it is noted that one group is 
more assisted just before an election that means that policy is not driven by anF 
FSW. As soon as the ruler is rational, if his objective function is not an FSW, it can 
only be a function of political support (possibly camouflaged as an FSW outside the 
election period: political speech advocating equity, social justice, etc.). So, one is 
actually in a context of endogenous policy. Private interests, possibly conflicting, 
thus influence the incumbent who takes them into account according to his function 
of political support and not according to an FSW. 
Empirical relevance 
What do we see in practice? If one looks for an increased activity of the lobbying 
kind before an election, one will get plenty of examples that simply match the 
opportunist government model.9 The problem is to differentiate systematically what 
relates to actions in favour of lobbies from what relates to actions in favour of 
(large) interest groups. There is a way to discriminate between these types of 
actions, which has been developed in recent works that are mainly empirical and 
some of which have not been published yet. 
Lagona and Padovano (2008) show for the Italian case that parliamentary activity 
is connected to the political cycle with more laws being voted at the end of the 
cycle (just before the next election). Brechler and Geršl (2011) analyse the political 
legislation cycle in the Czech Republic and bring out a two-peak cycle with 
                                                                                                         
9 Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2011: 35) have also recently demonstrated that the opportunistic pre-election 
distortions are connected to the prospect of winning elections: the smaller the win-margin, the higher 
pre-election distortions. 
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legislation activity increasing after the elections followed by a decrease around the 
middle of electoral cycle. The interpretation of Brechler and Geršl (2011: 20) is first, 
that incumbents keep their pre-election promises (the first peak after elections), 
and second, that they maximise political support by voters (the second peak just 
before next elections). As the analysis focuses on laws connected to transfer 
payments, that should concern large groups and not specific interests. So, there is 
a strong presumption that this empirical evidence confirms the relevance of our 
analysis that large interest groups passively shape political support-driven policies. 
Other recent works allow a finer analysis of the differences between favours to the 
lobbies and favours to the interest groups. Thus Padovano and Petrarca (2012) 
make an explicit distinction between legislation in the form of laws visible to all 
agents and decrees visible only to special interest groups. They consider that in 
order to collect election campaign resources from special interest groups, a 
legislator generates a pre-electoral cycle of the targeted good by distorting 
upwards the production of decrees. But, mainly, they show that the legislator 
generates an electoral cycle of the general public good at the end of the legislature 
by distorting upwards the production of laws to increase his probability of being re-
elected (Padovano and Petrarca 2012: 4). 
This analysis is tested by Padovano and Gavoille (2013) on French data covering 
the monthly counts of legislative production from 1959 to 2012 and providing 
detailed characteristics of the composition of the government as well as personal 
information about the ministers. 
The highest peaks of legislative production (and not decrees) occur towards the 
end of the legislature. All other things being equal, the legislative production 
increases by roughly 17 percent in the last year of the legislature, while this 
increase reaches 13 percent during the last six months of the presidential mandate. 
As the constitutional reform of 2000 gave the political mandates a time stability by 
synchronizing the legislative and presidential period, the authors also note that the 
peak of legislative production is particularly high when the legislature lasts its 
natural duration length. (p. 8). It means that the 17 percent increase does not come 
from a "rush to the end" (Padovano and Gavoille, 2013: 8 and 17) 
Padovano and Petrarca (2012) and Padovano and Gavoille (2013) allow us to 
discriminate between actions in favour of the lobbies and actions in favour of 
unorganised large interest groups. It is then shown that the legislator changes his 
agenda to favour the large groups at the end of his mandate and thereby distorts 
his economic policy before the election to make his policy closer to the interest 
(although not expressed) of large groups. 
These empirical analyses demonstrate that, independently of questions of 
intransitivity, it is certain that the influence of unorganised groups does not 
contribute to social welfare, even if they do not generate diversion of productive 
resources (DUPs), since the latter, whatever the form it is given, is not the target of 
the incumbent (for that we can work on social welfare without being blocked by the 
Arrow’s theorem). In this way, contrary to what it could seem, taking the interests of 
large groups into account tends to reduce social welfare. 
Conclusion 
The activity of interest groups is a source of waste of resources. In exchange for 
contributions paid (on the whole corresponding to waste), these activities aim at 
obtaining advantages from public authorities, particularly corresponding to 
obtaining or keeping market power (a classical case of endogenous protection: 
lobbies organise themselves to apply pressure with a view to customs tariffs which 
protect them from international competition). Therefore the economy can no longer 
be at the optimum and social welfare deteriorates. Apart from a few paradoxical 
situations, this point is commonly accepted in the literature. In this type of situation, 
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the efficiency of lobbying is inversely proportional to the size of the group (Olsonian 
condition): small groups are advantaged (particularly in that their incentives for 
collective action are stronger, particularly because their per capita gain is higher). 
This is why large groups are inefficient and do not manage to organise themselves 
into lobbies. This is especially the case for consumers whose associations have a 
very weak influence in relation to the number of agents they represent. 
Nevertheless these large groups can also be taken into account by those in power 
in a perspective of direct political support,that is through votes (endogenous 
economic policies in the widest sense influenced by active or passive groups). 
Moreover it is noted that the attention these groups benefit from depends on the 
political cycle (Padovano and Petrarca, 2012; Padovano and Gavoille, 2013). As 
the function of social welfare of the incumbent cannot be subject to these 
uncertainties (preferences are by definition exogenous), this means that actions in 
favour of large groups are driven by political support.10 
It must be concluded that policies driven by political support, which take the diverse 
interests of big groups into account, move the economy away from the optimum 
and reduce social welfare, in much the same way as classical lobbying would do. 
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